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ABSTRACT The broad topic of 'crime and cyberliberties' encompasses two major
subtopics: firstly, the extent to which online expression may be punished under
new criminal laws, even if it would be lawful in the traditional print media; and
secondly, the extent to which online privacy may be restricted to facilitate
enforcement of existing criminal laws. In both contexts, many law enforcement
officials argue that we have to make trade-offs between, on the one hand,
individual rights and, on the other hand, public safety. In fact, though, the alleged
dichotomy is oversimplified and misleading. Claims about the alleged unique
dangers of online expression are exaggerated, and the types of criminal laws and
law enforcement strategies that have worked effectively in other media are also
effective in cyberspace. For example, children should be protected from exploi-
tation in the production of child pornography through the same measures,
regardless of whether the material is distributed through postal mail or e-mail.
indeed, individuals and organizations who are devoted to protecting children from
exploitation and abuse-whether for the production of child pornography or any
other purpose-have expressed frustration that resources that should be used to
enforce existing laws are being diverted toward efforts to create new cyberspeech
crimes, such as the two US laws criminalizing online material that is 'indecent,'
'patently offensive', or 'harmful to minors'. The many judges who have ruled on
these laws-including the entire US Supreme Court-have agreed that they violate
free expression rights and are not necessary for their stated purpose of protecting
children. The battle to preserve online privacy has not been as successful in the
US, where the government restricts strong encryption despite the vigorous objec-
tions of not only cyberlibertarians, but also the business community. Moreover,
even some law enforcement and other government officials have concluded that,
on balance, security concerns are aided, not undermined, by strong encryption,
since it protects innocent individuals and legitimate businesses from
cybercriminals, and it also protects governments and vital infrastructures
from cyberterrorism. Most governments apparently recognize these facts since
they have not joined the US in restricting encryption technology.
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Introduction
I am delighted and honoured to address this important conference. I want to thank the
members of the Cyberlaw Research Unit at the University of Leeds not only for organizing
this conference and inviting me to participate in it, but also for their pathbreaking work on
cyberlaw and cyberliberties. They have been wonderful colleagues of mine and of the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) in both scholarly and advocacy endeavours.
I am proud that the ACLU, which is America's largest and oldest civil liberties
organization, has been at the forefront of the newest civil liberties frontier, in cyberspace-
not only throughout the US, but also, in collaboration with other organizations around the
world, on a global basis. We are spearheading an international coalition called the Global
Internet Liberty Campaign, or 'GILC'.3 And a couple of our most active, effective coalition
partners are in Britain and Ireland, including Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK),4 which
was founded by Yaman Akdeniz of the Leeds Cyberlaw Unit. In this international
conference, it is important to stress the international scope of our cyberliberties work. Of
course, cyberspace is an inherently global medium. And cybercrime and terrorism are
worldwide concerns. Likewise, though, preserving human rights in cyberspace is also an
international concern.
I have been asked to discuss the legal developments in the US, where we have had more
legislation and litigation in this area than any other country. Our courts' rulings have been
grounded specifically on US law-in particular, the free speech guarantee of the First
Amendment to our Constitution and our constitutional right of privacy. However, those
same freedoms are also guaranteed under international human rights law, under regional
human rights instruments, including the European Convention on Human Rights, and
under the domestic law of nations around the world.s Therefore, the principles that have
guided legal developments in the US should be relevant in the British Isles and elsewhere,
just as developments in Britain and in other parts of the world are also relevant in the US.
Overview of the Interrelationship between Cybercrime and Cyberliberties
The conference organizers asked me to outline the interrelationships between cybercrime
and cyberliberties. This broad subject encompasses two major subtopics: first, the extent to
which the exercise of certain liberties-notably, free expression-may be criminalized
online even if it would be lawful in the traditional print media; and second, the extent to
which online liberties-notably, privacy-may be restricted to facilitate punishment of
established crimes, such as trafficking in child pornography or engaging in information
terrorism. In other words, the first subtopic concerns whether government may restrict our
cyberliberties in order to create new crimes, peculiar to cyberspace, and the second
concerns whether government may restrict our cyberliberties in order to prosecute existing
crimes, common to all media, more effectively.
In both contexts, many officials argue that we have to make trade-offs between, on the
one hand, individual rights and, on the other hand, public safety. In fact, though, this
alleged tension is oversimplified and misleading. In terms of advancing public safety,
measures that stifle cyberliberties are often at best ineffective, and at worst counterproduc-
tive. This doubly-flawed nature of laws limiting cyberliberties shows the sadly prophetic
nature of a statement that Thomas Jefferson made to James Madison more than 200 years
ago, when these two American founders were corresponding about the Bill of Rights to the
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US Constitution. Jefferson warned that 'A society that will trade a little liberty for a little
order will deserve neither and will lose both'.'
This statement is right on the mark concerning the current debates about cybercrimes
and cyberliberties, for several reasons. First, claims about the alleged unique dangers of
online expression are exaggerated. Second, the types of criminal laws and enforcement
strategies that have worked effectively in other media are also effective in cyberspace.
Third, far from harming minors, much of the online expression that has been targeted for
censorship is affirmatively beneficial for them.
For these reasons, even those who specialize in protecting young people from sexual
exploitation and violence-indeed, especially those experts-oppose Internet censorship.
This is true, for example, of Ernie Allen, the Director of the National Center for Missing
& Exploited Children in the US, which works closely with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and local police agencies around our country. Mr Allen and his colleagues
understand that the political obsession with suppressing ideas and images that are allegedly
harmful to children's minds is a dangerous distraction and diversion from constructive
efforts to protect actual children from tangible harm.' In short, cybercensorship does no
more good for the safety and welfare of young people than it does for the free speech rights
of everyone-and I say 'everyone' advisedly, since young people have free speech rights of
their own.
The same false tension between liberty and security also marks too much of the political
rhetoric about protecting online privacy through such measures as strong encryption or
cryptography and anonymous communications. To be sure, law enforcement would to
some extent be aided if officials could easily gain access to online communications, just as
law enforcement would receive some benefits if officials could readily spy on all communi-
cations of any type. But such pervasive surveillance would violate internationally respected,
fundamental privacy rights.' The consensus of the international community is that this
would be too high a price to pay for reducing crime. After all, what would be the point of
limiting our fellow citizens' interference with our personal security, only at the price of
increasing police officers' interference with the very same security?o This point was
eloquently stated by a great former Justice of the US Supreme Court, Louis Brandeis, who
was one of the architects of the legal right to privacy even before he ascended to the high
Court.
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected
to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen ... . Our Government is
the potent, the omnipresent teacher ... . Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes
a lawbreaker it breeds contempt for law ... . To declare that in the administration of the
criminal law the end justifies the means-... that the Government may commit crimes in
order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution.12
Just as weakened privacy protections would let government officials access online commu-
nications by ordinary, law-abiding citizens, these same weakened protections would also
enhance access to online communications by cybercriminals and terrorists. They will not
comply with government restrictions on encryption. To the contrary, they will take all
available measures to secure their own communications, including illegal measures. Mean-
while, thanks to legal limits on encryption, cybercriminals will more easily prey on
law-abiding individuals and businesses, and vital infrastructures will be more vulnerable to
cyberterrorists. For these reasons, even some government officials have joined with cyber-
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libertarians in opposing limits on encryption. They concur that, on balance, such limits do
more harm than good to public safety.1 3
That, in a nutshell, is my broad overview of the relationship between cyberliberties and
crime control: namely, that this relationship, far from being inherently antagonistic, is often
mutually reinforcing. In many respects, law and public policy are developing in a way that
is consistent with this perspective. In the US, the courts consistently have struck down new
laws that seek to criminalize online expression that would be legal in other media. Many
judges who have ruled on such laws have agreed with the ACLU and other cyberlibertar-
ians that the laws are not in fact well-designed for protecting children, which is their
asserted goal. These judges include the entire US Supreme Court, ruling in the landmark
1997 case striking down the first federal Internet censorship law in the US, the Communi-
cations Decency Act, or 'CDA',14 in Reno v. ACLU. 1s
Now we have to call that case ACLU v. Reno I, since the US federal government recently
enacted its second cybercensorship law, the so-called 'Child Online Protection Act' or
'COPA',16 which we are now fighting in a case called ACLU v. Reno II.1 With a name like
the 'Child Online Protection Act', it is not surprising that few politicians had the political
courage to oppose this law. Fortunately, though, the only judge to rule on the law to date
has agreed with us that it is not only unconstitutional, but also unwise and misnamed since
it does not really protect children. Indeed, he concluded his opinion on this note: '[P]erhaps
we do the minors of this country harm if First Amendment protections, which they will
with age inherit fully, are chipped away in the name of their protection.'1
When we turn from online free speech to privacy, the US courts have likewise been
supportive of our arguments that restricting cyberliberties cannot be justified in terms of the
alleged countervailing law enforcement concerns. For example, in ACLU v. Miller,19 we
successfully challenged a state law that prohibited anonymous and pseudonymous online
communications. There have, though, been fewer rulings concerning privacy than free
speech in the online context, they have only been issued by lower-level courts, and they
have not been as consistently supportive of the cyberliberties positions. 20
In the US, the battle over online privacy and encryption is being waged mostly in the
legislative and executive branches of government, rather than in the courts, with the
Clinton Administration steadily opposing strong encryption, but with many members of
Congress, from both major political parties, on the other side. Thus far, at least, the US
government is quite isolated in the international community in this respect, since most
other countries allow strong encryption. 2 1 That is certainly true in Europe, which in general
has stronger legal protections for privacy of communications and data than we have in the
US. 22 However, the Clinton Administration is working hard to export its anti-privacy,
anti-encryption stance around the world,2 3 and it has gained support from some officials
here in Britain, for example. Therefore, it is essential to understand why this stance is as
inimical to public safety as it is to personal privacy.
Criminalizing Sexually-Oriented Online Expression
Now that I have sketched out the general picture concerning the relationship between
cyberliberties and cybercrime, I would like to spend the rest of my time filling in some of
the details. Let me start with the area where we have had the most legislation and litigation
in the US, since this is also an area of great concern in other countries, including right here
in Britain: namely, criminalizing online expression that is sexually oriented. In fact, Yaman
14
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Akdeniz and I are co-authoring a book chapter on this topic, focusing on this aspect of
cyberlaw in both the UK and the US. 24
In the US, from the moment that cyberspace first hit the public radar screen, we
immediately saw political and media hysteria about 'cyberporn' and efforts to censor online
expression of a sexual nature. This reaction was not surprising. Despite Americans' general
commitment to free speech, throughout our history, any sexually-oriented expression in
any medium has always been suspect. That is because of my country's Puritanical
heritage-which, of course, we share with the British Isles. One of America's most popular
humorists, Garrison Keillor, put it this way: 'My ancestors were Puritans from England
[who] arrived in America in 1648 in the hope of finding greater restrictions than were
permissible under English law at the time.' 2s Consistent with this long-standing American
tradition, we are seeing many efforts to stifle online sexual expression, all over the US, at
all levels of government, from the US Congress and Clinton Administration to local school
boards and library boards. 2 From a free speech perspective, that is the bad news about
sexually-oriented expression online.
But there is good news too. Just as elected officials have mostly supported censorship of
sexually-oriented online material, the courts have provided a welcome contrast, as I have
indicated. So far, the ACLU has brought constitutional challenges to seven new laws
censoring sexually-oriented material online: the two federal statutes I already mentioned;2
four state laws (in New York,28 Virginia,29 New Mexico 3 0 and Michigan3 1 ); and one local
law (in Loudoun County, Virginia3 2). And so far, we have won every single one of these
challenges, with only one recent exception, which I do not think is too significant for
cyberliberties (as I will explain in a moment). Moreover, these decisions affirming freedom
of cyberspeech have been joined in by 19 different judges who span a broad ideological
spectrum, having been appointed by the last six US Presidents, going all the way back to
Richard Nixon (including four Republicans and two Democrats). In short, the ACLU
position on online free speech is essentially the position that is now enshrined in First
Amendment law.
The one recent setback is an intermediate appellate court ruling on a Virginia state law
restricting government employees' access to sexually-oriented online material.3 3 The US
Supreme Court has held that the government, when it acts as employer, may impose more
limits on its employees' expression than the government, when it acts as sovereign, may
impose on its citizens' expression.3 4 Nevertheless, the lower court agreed with us that
Virginia's law violated even the reduced free speech rights of government employees.35 in
contrast, the intermediate appellate court overturned that decision in February, 1999 on the
broad rationale that government employees have no free speech rights concerning any
communications in any medium whenever they act primarily in their role as employees. 36
So, this court was not imposing special restrictions on expression in cyberspace as opposed
to other media. Rather, it was imposing special restrictions on expression by government
employees, regardless of the medium. We think this ruling was wrong, and hope to
overturn it on further appeal. In any event, though, it really does not have any special
impact specifically on cyberlaw or cyberliberties.
In contrast, our two most recent victories in cybercensorship cases do have broad
positive implications for online free speech, so I would like to describe those. First, let me
tell you a bit more about our lower court victory in February, 1999 in ACLU v. Reno II,
against the second federal cybercensorship law, COPA. In response to the Supreme Court's
decision striking down the CDA in ACLU I,37 Congress wrote a somewhat less sweeping
law the second time around. The CDA had criminalized any online expression that is
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'patently offensive' 38 or 'indecent'. 39 In contrast, COPA outlaws any online communication
'for commercial purposes' 40 that 'includes any material that is harmful to minors'. 41 Both
of COPA's critical terms are defined broadly. First, a communication is 'for commercial
purposes' if it is made 'as a regular course of ... trade or business, with the objective of
earning a profit', even if no profit is actually made. 42 Therefore, COPA applies to many
not-for-profit Websites, which provide information completely free-including the ACLU's
own Website. Second, material is 'harmful to minors' if it satisfies US law's three-part
obscenity definition specifically as to minors-namely, if it appeals to the prurient interest
in sex, is patently offensive, and lacks serious value, from a minor's perspective. 43
I should note that the ACLU opposes the obscenity exception that the US Supreme Court
has carved out of the First Amendment (over the dissenting votes of many respected
Justices).t However, we have not used our cybercensorship cases as occasions for challeng-
ing that exception. In other words, we have not challenged these new laws to the extent
that they simply transplant to cyberspace existing free speech exceptions, which have been
upheld in other media-in particular, obscenity, child pornography, and solicitation of a
minor for sexual purposes. Rather, what we have actively opposed in these new laws is
their creation of new, broader categories of expression that is unprotected specifically
online, even though it would be constitutionally protected in traditional print media. So,
with that perspective, let me turn back to ACLU v. Reno II. On 1 February 1999, a federal
judge, Lowell Reed, granted our motion for a preliminary injunction.45 He enjoined the
government from enforcing COPA pending the trial on the merits. Judge Reed held that we
had shown the necessary 'likelihood of success' on the merits of our claim that COPA
violates the First Amendment for many of the same reasons that CDA did.
Since COPA regulates expression that is protected 'at least as to adults', 46 Judge Reed
ruled, it is presumptively unconstitutional unless the government can satisfy the demanding
'strict scrutiny' test. It has to show both that the law's purpose is to promote an interest
of 'compelling' importance and that the law is narrowly tailored to promote that purpose-
in other words, that there are no 'less restrictive alternative' measures, which would be less
burdensome on free speech.4 Judge Reed concluded that the government does have a
compelling interest in shielding minors even from materials that are not obscene by adult
standards. 48 However, Judge Reed also concluded that the government was unlikely to be
able to show that COPA is the least restrictive means of achieving this goal. 49 For example,
Judge Reed noted that the evidence before him 'reveals that blocking or filtering technology
may be at least as successful as COPA would be in restricting minors' access to harmful
material online without imposing the burden on constitutionally protected speech that
COPA imposes on adult users or Web site operators'.so The government has appealed from
Judge Reed's ruling.s1 Quite likely, this case will go all the way to the US Supreme Court,
which has only issued one decision on the 'harmful to minors' doctrine, which was more
than 30 years ago. 2
Now let me turn to our second recent victory, in another important cyberspeech case,
which is also still working its way through the court system. This case is called Mainstream
Loudoun v. Loudoun County Library,53 and it is so far the only court ruling on the
burgeoning controversy over filtering and blocking software. Ever since it became clear that
the CDA and other direct censorial measures were facing constitutional difficulties,
advocates of suppressing online sexual expression stepped up their promotion of rating
and filtering systems, which would also bar access to the same expression. The ACLU
has issued two reports explaining why all these systems are problematic for many
reasons.54
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For one thing, the filtering software is inevitably both under-inclusive and over-inclusive,
in terms of blocking all the material it purports to, and only that material. Therefore, while
individual Internet users certainly have the right to install software on their own computers
that blocks out material they consider contrary to their values, there is still a problem.
Almost all manufacturers of blocking software refuse to disclose either the sites they block
or the criteria they use to determine which sites they will block. Consequently, the
manufacturers are imposing their value choices on their customers. They are not facilitating
the customers' exercise of their own freedom of choice. In short, this is really more of a
consumer protection problem than a free speech problem. However, there is a serious free
speech problem when the filtering software is installed not as a matter of choice on the part
of individual users, but rather, by government officials who control the computers-in
public institutions. Across the US, officials are busily installing or advocating blocking
software on computers in public libraries, schools, and universities." Therefore, individual
choice is stripped from the many members of the public whose only access to the Internet
is through such computers. For them, the installation of filtering software on, say, library
computers has the same censorial impact as the removal of books from library shelves. And
book banning is precisely the analogy that was invoked by the only court that has ruled on
this issue to date. In November 1998, federal judge Leonie Brinkema upheld a First
Amendment challenge to mandatory filtering software that had been installed in the
Loudoun County, Virginia public libraries. 6 Pursuant to a 'Policy on Internet Sexual
Harassment', the library officials required software to block 'child pornography and
obscene material', as well as material deemed 'harmful to juveniles' under state law.5
As an aside-but an important one-I want to note the distorted, overbroad concept of
sexual harassment that is reflected in this policy, along with too many others. The policy
assumes that the presence of sexually oriented expression on library computer terminals
ipso facto constitutes illegal sexual harassment. But that assumption is patently incorrect.
As the US Supreme Court has held, expression does not give rise to a sexual harassment
claim merely because a person at whom it is directed considers it offensive."
Even beyond the library's misguided concept of sexual harassment, it also implemented
its policy in a way that violated online First Amendment rights, and that was the focus of
Judge Brinkema's ruling. Specifically, the library installed a commercial software product
called 'X-Stop'. Judge Brinkema held that the filtering requirement operated as a presump-
tively unconstitutional 'prior restraint' on expression. Therefore, it had to withstand the
same type of strict judicial scrutiny that has also been applied to other censorial laws, such
as CDA and COPA.59
Judge Brinkema assumed for the sake of argument that the government's asserted
interests were of compelling importance-namely, its interests in minimizing access to
obscenity and child pornography, and in avoiding the creation of a sexually hostile
environment.6 0 However, Judge Brinkema concluded that the blocking policy was unconsti-
tutional on several, independently sufficient, grounds: (1) it is not necessary to further the
government's asserted interests; (2) it 'is not narrowly tailored'; (3) it limits adult patrons
to accessing only material that is fit for minors; (4) it 'provides inadequate standards for
restricting access'; and (5) it 'provides inadequate procedural safeguards to ensure prompt
judicial review'. 61
One particularly interesting feature of Judge Brinkema's analysis is her catalogue of 'less
restrictive means' that Loudoun County could have used to pursue its asserted interests:
installing privacy screens; charging library staff with casual monitoring of Internet use;
installing filtering software only on some Internet terminals, and limiting minors to those
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terminals; and installing filtering software that could be turned off when an adult is using
the terminal. 6 2 Significantly, Judge Brinkema cautioned that while all of the foregoing
alternatives are less restrictive than the challenged mandatory filtering policy, she did not
'find that any of them would necessarily be constitutional', since that question was not
before her. 63 Loudoun County officials decided not to appeal from Judge Brinkema's
ruling. 64 Of course, the constitutional questions involved will not be settled until the US
Supreme Court rules on them in another filtering controversy. 6
Debates about Online Privacy and Cryptography
In the following sections, I would like to amplify a bit on the second major aspect of the
cyberliberties/ crime debate that I outlined earlier: the controversy about online privacy and
encryption or cryptography. Advocates of restricting encryption argue that, as the price for
barring criminals and terrorists from using effective cryptography, we must also bar
law-abiding citizens and businesses from doing so. This rationale was effectively debunked
in an excellent report that Cyber-Rights and Cyber-Liberties (UK) issued in September 1998
and entitled 'Cyber-crime and Information Terrorism'6 6 : 'Many things are valuable to
criminals and terrorists but this alone does not provide a reason for imposing controls ... .
[C]riminals find cars useful but society doesn't control the supply of cars because of this.' 6
In light of this passage, it is ironic to note that when the automobile was first invented,
law enforcement officials did seek to restrict its usage, precisely because they did fear that
it would facilitate criminal activities. 6' Today that argument seems ludicrous, but, at
bottom, it is precisely the same as the one that is now being offered in an attempt to justify
restrictions on cryptography. This is the argument that is being made by the Clinton
Administration in the US. The Clinton Administration insists that the only kind of
encryption technology that should be available is 'key recovery' or 'key escrow' cryptogra-
phy. Yet this type of encryption is inherently insecure, since it is expressly designed to give
covert access to the plaintext of encrypted data to a third party-in particular, the
government.
Although some government officials contend that there is a conflict between cyberliber-
ties and cybercrime or cyberterrorism, in fact, that is not so. To the contrary, this situation
vividly illustrates Thomas Jefferson's observation I previously quoted: about liberty and
security concerns working in tandem, rather than in tension, with each other. Indeed, it is
particularly apt to refer to Jefferson's communications with Madison in the cryptography
context; when these two American founders corresponded prior to the signing of the
Declaration of Independence, they encoded all their messages-in short, they used 18th-
century-style encryption!69 Notwithstanding the Clinton Administration's adamant official
position, individual officers and agencies in the US government have broken ranks. One
important example is a high-level US government committee: the National Research
Council (NRC) committee on cryptography. In its 1996 report, this committee concluded
that strong encryption is essential for promoting law enforcement and national security:
If cryptography can protect the trade secrets and proprietary information of businesses
and thereby reduce economic espionage (which it can), it also supports in a most
important manner the job of law enforcement. If cryptography can help protect nation-
ally critical information systems and networks against unauthorized penetration (which
it can), it also supports the national security of the United States.70
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Accordingly, even though this NRC report recognized that restricting encryption would
strengthen some law enforcement efforts, it nevertheless concluded that '[o]n balance, the
advantages of more widespread use of cryptography outweigh the disadvantages'. 1 Some
of the reasons for this conclusion were outlined as follows in a September 1998 GILC report
that focused specifically on the precise type of cryptography regulation that has been
enforced and advocated by the US-export restrictions:
[E]xport controls on cryptography hurt law-abiding companies and citizens without
having any significant impact on the ability of criminals, terrorists or belligerent nations
to obtain any cryptographic products they wish;
[E]xport restrictions imposed by the major cryptography-exporting states limit the ability
of other nations to defend themselves against electronic warfare attacks on vital
infrastructure;
[F]ailure to protect the free use and distribution of cryptographic software will jeopar-
dize the life and freedom of human rights activists, journalists and political activists all
over the world;
[A]ny restriction on the use of cryptographic programs will be unenforceable in practice,
since the basic mathematical and algorithmic methods for strong encryption are widely
published and can easily be implemented in software by any person skilled in the art;
[T]he increasingly common use of public networks to electronically distribute such
products in intangible form reinforces the unenforceability of export controls. 2
For the foregoing reasons, restrictions on encryption are not even effective, let alone
necessary, in countering cybercrime. On this ground alone, such restrictions should be
rejected. But there are also additional grounds for this conclusion. For one thing, the
government cannot show that there is in fact a substantial danger of the specific type of
crime that is claimed most urgently to warrant restrictions on cryptography-namely,
information terrorism. Fortunately, claims about this potential problem turn out to be
greatly overblown. This was shown, for example, by a recent study, published in the Fall
1998 Internet publication, Issues in Science and Technology Online. Its title effectively
summarizes its conclusion: 'An Electronic Pearl Harbor? Not Likely'. The study was
written by George Smith, an expert on computer crime, security and information warfare.73
He dismissed government and media descriptions of the dangers of cyberterrorism as
'myths',74 'hoaxes' and 'the electronic ghost stories of our time'. 6 Although the Smith
study focused on the US, no doubt it is relevant for other countries too. Here is its
conclusion:
The government's evidence about U.S. vulnerability to cyber attack is shaky at
best. ... Although the media are full of scary-sounding stories about violated military
Web sites and broken security on public and corporate networks, the menacing scenarios
have remained just that-only scenarios. ... [An examination of the] sketchy information
that the government has ... provided ... casts a great deal of doubt on the claims.
Precisely the same conclusion was reached by a report by a commission appointed by
President Clinton on 'Critical Infrastructure Protection'. The Commission was charged
with analysing the danger that information terrorists could pose to our nation's infrastruc-
ture-communications lines, power grids and transportation networks. The Commission's
members consisted largely of military and intelligence officials. Therefore, the Commission
was, presumably, especially sympathetic toward government claims of law enforcement
and national security threats. Yet even this group was forced to acknowledge that there was
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no evidence of an 'impending cyber attack which could have a debilitating effect on the
nation's critical infrastructure'.7
Nonetheless, that recognition did not deter the commission from seizing upon the fear
of cyberterrorism to press for government measures that constrict individual rights,
including key recovery encryption. Indeed, the Commission was so eager to leverage public
concerns about info-terrorism into heightened government surveillance over the public, that
it disregarded the countervailing dangers that key recovery encryption poses to the very
infrastructure that the Commission was created to protect!0 Those dangers were well-de-
scribed, for example, in the recent report by Cyber-Rights & Cyber-Liberties (UK), on
'Cyber-crime and Information Terrorism':
Increasingly, the economies of the developed and developing nations are dependent on
networked computing resources. Irrespective of whether it is communications, electrical
power generation, road, rail or air transport, stock exchanges, banks, finance houses,
agriculture, hospitals or a host of other infrastructures, all now depend on regular and
continuous information exchanges between networked computer systems for their con-
tinuing safe operation. In the absence of effective cryptographic protection the computer
systems that keep these infrastructures operating are wide open to attacks by terrorist
and criminal organizations using only modest resources. Cryptographic ... controls are
preventing the protection of these civil infrastructures and rendering them easy and
tempting targets for international terrorists and criminals. Far from impeding crime and
terrorism, therefore, controls on cryptography are having precisely the opposite impact. 1
These same dangers had been heralded in a May 1997 report by 'an Ad Hoc Group of
Cryptographers and Computer Scientists', 'The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and
Trusted Third Party Encryption':
Any key recovery infrastructure, by its very nature, introduces a new and vulnerable path
to the unauthorized recovery of data where one did not otherwise exist. This ... creates
new concentrations of decryption information that are high-value targets for criminals or
other attackers ... . The key recovery infrastructure will tend to create extremely
valuable targets, more likely to be worth the cost and risk of attack.
In sum, not only are claims about the dangers of cyberterrorism exaggerated, but also, the
proposed counter-measures-notably, restrictions on cryptography-far from being necess-
ary to respond to any such dangers, are not even effective; to the contrary, they are
counterproductive.
A number of recent government reports have reached precisely the same conclusions. For
example, last September, a European Parliament report called for rejecting encryption
controls, including those advocated by the US.83 Significantly, this report was issued in the
wake of increasing evidence of unjustified surveillance by law enforcement agencies in
various European countries. Indeed, the vast majority of governments that have considered
the issue have opposed restrictions on encryption. This pattern was documented by a
comprehensive report that GILC issued in February 1998, entitled 'Cryptography and
Liberty'.8 4 It surveyed the cryptography policies of all countries in the world, based on
direct communications with their governments. It concluded that, in most countries,
cryptography may be freely used, manufactured, and sold without restriction. As the GILC
report concluded that '[flor those [countries] that have considered the topics, interests
in electronic commerce and privacy ... outweigh the concerns expressed by law
enforcement'.s
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Conclusion
In conclusion, everyone who values human life-and human rights-must of course be
vigilant against the fear, insecurity, and manipulation caused by terrorists and other
criminals. But we must also be vigilant against the fear, insecurity, and manipulation
caused by those who seek to fight against criminals. In a classic 1927 opinion, the great US
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis cautioned against ceding our hard-won freedoms to
even well-intentioned government agents. Tellingly, that opinion warned against electronic
surveillance and restrictions on free speech and privacy with respect to the then-newest
communication technology-the telephone-despite claims about the urgent need to fight
against telephonic crime. Justice Brandeis's stirring, prophetic words apply fully to elec-
tronic surveillance and restrictions on free speech and privacy with respect to the
now-newest communication technology-cyberspace-despite claims about the urgent
need to fight against cybercrimes and information terrorism. As Justice Brandeis warned:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when
the government' s purposes are beneficent ... . The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding. 6
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